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absolute and unbounded, of the will, which is contradicted 
by experience and by reason. Only by making the rational 
agent essentially and thoroughly mysterious are they able 
to make an equally mysterious doctrine appear appropriate. 
Frankly, I find the move most unhappy, for it apparently 
removes from the realm of rational inquiry the rational 
agent himself. I find that not only contradicted by what 
I believe are the principles of Being itself, but also a 
fruitless attempt, for the notion of freedom so purchased 
is completely unable to aid human understanding in any way 
whatsoever. As I have previously indicated that I am not 
entirely certain what is intended by the forementioned 
claim, I hope and trust that if I have misconstrued it in 
some way that its propounder will instruct me further in 
its meaning. This ends what I wish to say at this time 
about substance. 
Johannes Gutenberg-Oniversit'at 
Mainz 
98 
Connecting Nature and Freedom in 
Kant's Third Critique 
Thomas Donaldson 
One of the express purposes of Kant's Critique of Judgment 
is to provide the all important ground of mediation Between the 
two earlier Critiques. Indeed the ultimate success of Kant's 
critical philosophy itself may be said to hang with his ability 
to demonstrate that such a ground of mediation exists to unite 
the seemingly different realms of nature and of freedom. To view 
Kant as offering two worlds for our consideration, one (as in 
the first Cri tique) which stands only under the mechanical laws 
of nature and the categories, and the other (as in the second 
Critique) which stands only under the laws of freedom, is to 
recognize in Kant an uncomfortable dualism which, without making 
any allowances, we should find untenable. 
Because our idea of philosophy as a system (and indeed of 
reality itself as unified) does not allow an absolute plurality 
with no ground of mediation from one to another, we are prone to 
reject as untenable any philosophy which suggests an absolute 
plurality. And yet we do discover in Kant a kind of absolute 
plurality in his separation of understanding from reason; a 
separation which, in turn, divides the theoretical from the 
practical , the realm of nature from the realm of freedom, and 
finally the territory of the first Critique from the territory 
of the second Cri tique. 
Now 1 believe it is precisely because this separation is 
regarded as unavoidable and even necessary by Kant that the need 
for a ground of mediation becomes so pressing, and I hope to 
clarify in this paper the role of the third Crit ique in effecting 
this mediation. True to his method, Kant aims here at a synthesis 
of nature and freedom by introducing a "third thing" which will 
provide a common basis of unity; and in this case the "third 
thing" is simply an indeterminate condition for apprehending 
nature and freedom themselves. 
It is right to begin this investigation by recognizing the 
bare pluralities which are explicit in Kant's philosophy. By the 
time of the writing of the third Critique it is clear that the 
legislation of reason results in at least two kinds of conditions: 
in its theoretical employment it results in the conditions of nature, 
and in its practical employment it results in the conditions of 
freedom. Now this double division of the legislation of reason 
(to which a third division will be added in the Cri tique of 
Judgment) cannot be reduced to an obvious unity according to Kant, 
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and he remarks caustically in the l;i rst 1 nt roduct ion to the 
C r i t i q tie of J ildamen t that 
philosophers who otherwise deserve unstinted praise for 
their profound way of thinking have tried to explain away 
this division as only apparent, . . . and yet it can be 
quile easily demonstrated that this attempt to.bring 
unity into u plurality of faculties is futile. 
In the Cri t ique of Judgment Kant not only defends the double 
division of the legislation of reason, but also introduces and 
defends the existence of a third. The powers of the human mind, 
he argues, can all be traced back to three which are: the faculty 
of cognition, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and the 
faculty of desire. Understanding in this context is merely the 
cognitive faculty considered with respect to the capacity for 
cognition according to principles, and it provides the domain for 
the first Cri t ique. Judgment likewise becomes merely the feeling 
of pleasure and dTspleasure considered with respect to the 
capacity for cognition according to principles, and it provides 
the domain for the third Cri t ique. And finally, reason is merely 
the faculty of desire consTJered with respect to its capacity 
for cognition according to principles, and it provides the domain 
for the second Cri tique. 
Completing this picture of a three-way division for our 
mental powers, Kant suggests that understanding is the capacity 
for knowledge of the universal, while judgment is the capacity 
for subsumption of the particular under the universal, and reason 
is the capacity for the determination of the particular through 
the universal. 
Now one may ask here, in a spirit of parsimony, just why such 
divisions need exist at all in Kant's philosophy? Is not reality, 
not to mention the soul itself, one rather than many? For Kant's 
answer to this question, a quite significant yet deceptively simple 
passage from the Fi rst Introduct ion to the Cri t ique of Judgment 
will have to suffice. He says 
. . . there is always a great difference between (considering) 
representations so far as they, related merely to the object 
and the unity of (our) consciousness of it, belong to know-
ledge, and referring them to the faculty of desire through 
that objective relation in which they are regarded as the 
cause of the reality of the object. This latter case is 
further distinct from considering representations merely 
in relation to the subject, in which case they afford their 
own grounds for maintaining their existence in the subject 
and are regarded in relation to the feeling of pleasure. 
In other words, objectivity and the unity of our consciousness 
provide a condition for considering representations as synthesized 
into "nature" and as yielding theoretical knowledge; while at the 
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same time, representations (as desires conditioned by the moral 
law) must be considered as actually creating the objectivity of 
free human action (the objects of practical reason). And finally 
representations may be considered in their own right as being 
related to a subject and, as such, admitting of the feelings of 
pleasure and pain. 
Someone may deny one or another of these pure possibilities 
in the consideration of representations as outlined by Kant, but 
the price is high. For in doing so one denies the reality of 
either nature, freedom, or feeling; and although such denials are 
common enough nowdays (it is especially common to encounter 
denials of freedom and feeling), my own guess is that these three 
pure possibilities given by Kant will continue to raise them-
selves in the face of such denials. More needs to be said here 
but such a discussion must be postponed for purposes of this 
paper. 
Suppose then for present purposes that Kant is justified 
in asserting this three-way distinction. It should then be asked 
what is the special significance of feeling, that is "representa-
tions considered merely in relation to the subject," regarding 
the preceding two possibilities, viz. the realm of freedom and the 
realm of nature? Is there a special role played by the acsthetical, 
the feeling of pleasure and pain, regarding freedom and nature; 
and does this special role offer a ground of mediation between the 
first and second Critiques? 
Providing an answer, I believe, requires first an understanding 
of the way in which judgment is intrinsically related to the 
feeling of pleasure and pain --something which is certainly not 
obvious at first glance--and secondly, a demonstration of how the 
a priori principle of purposiveness , required by judgment, 
actually effects such a mediation. 
Now when the so-called "manifold" of feeling is regarded in 
the manner Kant has already suggested, that is as representations 
considered in their own right, it becomes fairly obvious that 
feeling is not being considered with respect to remote or universal 
concepts, but with the particular and immediate character of what 
is "here right now." We are concerned with what, if one will 
pardon the expression, is "right under our noses," and that which 
is right under our noses is called "feeling." Thus, understanding 
how judgment is related to feeling is no more difficult than 
understanding how judgment is related to the particular and 
immediate thing we are judging. Judgment subsumes the particular 
under the universal and, in an important sense, the ultimate 
particular is "feeling." 
I think A. C. Genova is quite correct, however, in saying 
here that the manifold of feeling is a "peculiar" manifold for 
Kant. Genova points out in a recent article that the manifold 
of feeling is not a new territory, analogous to the earlier 
territories of freedom and nature, but a "dwelling place" (Kant's 
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own expression) of concepts. "Kant's material philosophy is 
completely exhausted by the theoretical concepts of nature and 
the practical concepts of freedom," Genova remarks, "but if it 
is a question merely of something that remains undetermined by 
reason or understanding, then, indeed, there is such an area 
manifested by the complex of objects of sense in their individ-
uality and particularity." 3 Considering the realm of nature, for 
example, it seems clear that in the first Critique Kant laid down 
the pure conditions for nature in general and experience in 
general, "but that this particular is connected with that, that 
this specific event is the event it is, can hardly be judged a 
priori."4 
Kant believed that judgment actually has two sides, the 
determinate and the reflective, and it is the reflective judgment 
rather than the determinate judgment which presupposes an a 
priori principle and which takes first place in the discussions 
of the third Cri tique• Although a determinate judgment involves 
merely the determination "of a basic concept by means of a given 
empirical representation," reflective judgment involves the 
capacity of "reflecting on a given representation according to a 
certain principle, to produce a possible concept." 5 "To reflect 
(or to deliberate)," Kant says, "is to compare and combine 
given representations either with other representations or with 
one's cognitive powers, with respect to a concept which is thereby 
made possible." 6 One would be employing determinate judgment in 
saying "There must be some explanation of this," so that in this 
case the basic concept of "some explanation" is determined by the 
particular at hanJ; whereas one would be employing reflective 
judgment in saying "This pot looks like it's been used," so that 
in this case the reflection and deliberation over the given 
particular has produced the possible concept of "being used." 
Now insofar as the reflection and deliberation does not occur 
unaided and, as it were, in a vacuum, Kant suggests that there 
must be a principle which serves as a guide to such reflection. 
This principle is that of "purposiveness," and it alone claims 
title to the a priori condition of all reflective judgment. 
When first encountering the so-called principle of purposive-
ness, one's impulse is to cry "foul I" and ask why reflective 
judgment must assume the existence of a single concrete purpose 
anywhere; after all, couldn't nature be perfectly mechanical and 
still yield herself to our judgment? But this is not Kant's 
meaning at all and, indeed, he convincingly makes the point that 
nature may be purely mechanical in his own "Critique of Teleo-
logical Judgment." 
What Kant means is not that intuition couldn't yield itself to 
our cognitive faculties if nature were purely mechanical, but 
that we must suppose that intuition wi11 actually yield itself to 
our cognitive faculties. Just this and nothing more. That what 
we are judging is capable of being judged, that it fits and will 
yield to the aims of our cognitive faculties, is the meaning of the 
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indeterminate principle of purposiveness. We assume that nature 
is purposive with respect to our cognitive faculties and that it 
will display a systematic and logical unity; this is not concrete 
purposiveness, such as one might attribute to the acorn on its 
way to becoming an oak tree, but a formal purposiveness which 
assumes that nature was "made to fit" our ideas about her--a 
little like assuming that a shoe will fit one's foot. 
But since it is an assumption that a particular shoe will fit 
one's foot, the principle of purposiveness in the third Critique, 
cannot be one which determines nature and, instead, is an indeterminate 
concept which must take nature "as if" she were perfectly suited 
to our cognition. The indeterminate principle or purposiveness 
conditions no new realm of objectivity as did the principles of 
the two earlier Critiques. Assuming that nature is, like a 
piece of art, designed for our cognitive faculties, may be 
necessary for the purposes of reflective judgment, but it leaves 
open the real possibility that nature may not be like art at all. 
Even the categorical conditions given to nature in its generality 
in the first Critique do not rule out the possibility that it is 
so chaotic in its particularity as to frustrate understanding. 
Kant remarks that 
. . . although experience forms a system under transcendental 
laws, which comprise the condition of the possibility of 
experience in general, there might still occur such an 
infinj te multiplicity of empirical 1aws and so great a heter-
ogeneity of natural forms in particular experience that the 
concept of -a system in accordance with these empirical laws 
would necessarily be alien to the understanding . . J 
And again 
. . . for the variety and diversity of the empirical laws might 
be so great that, while it would be in part possible to unify 
these empirical laws themselves under a common principle, were 
it the case (which is perfectly possible a priori) that the 
variety and dissimilarity of these laws, and also of the 
corresponding natural forms, were infinite and that we were 
confronted by a crude, chaotic aggregate totally devoid of 
system, even though we had to presuppose a system in accordance 
with transcendental laws.8 
The representation of nature as art is a necessary and unavoidable 
assumption, but it is nonetheless an Idea, and as a principle of 
our investigation is thus subjective. 
It should be noted that, where I have presented the concept of 
purposiveness as it already occurs participating in the system of 
Kant's philosophy, Kant himself offers independent grounds for the 
existence of this principle in the third Critique. Although I 
will not be able to offer a complete account or the way in which 
Kant offers his justification, it is extremely important to 
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recognize that independent grounds do exist for this principle, 
and perhaps a brief sketch will help. 
In brief, Kant finds the clue which leads to the justification 
of the principle in the apparently conflicting claims made by the 
apprehension of beauty. The aesthetic feeling connected with the 
apprehension of a beautiful object is at the same time subjective 
and objective. It rests apparently on feeling which is merely 
subjective; yet it claims objectivity in its demand for universal 
assent, and, indeed, we regard a truly beautiful object as beauti-
ful for everyone. Kant thus faces the problem that beauty must, 
on the one hand, involve a concept so as to claim universality and 
necessity, anJ yet, on the other, involve no concept insofar as 
it rests on mere subjective feeling. The resolution of the problem 
lies, of course, with the discovery of the indeterminate concept 
of formal purposiveness; a discovery which makes beauty under-
standahle by basing its feeling on the harmony of understanding and 
imagination, and which discloses the transcendental ground for 
aesthetic feeling. 
Likewise, with regard to the teleological judgment, Kant 
demonstrates the way in which our attribution of concrete inner 
purposiveness to objects of nature (as an acorn is purposive) , 
which we do even in light of the possibility that nature may be 
entirely mechanical, can only rest on the a priori principle of 
purposiveness which, in this case, is borrowed by judgment from 
reason as a regulative idea. 
Now one might say that it is a "happy accident" that we dis-
cover in the world things that are beautiful, things that are 
sublime, and things that are organized so as to be understandable 
only through teleology; and this would be quite right. Indeed, 
neither the a priori conditions of freedom and nature, nor the 
indeterminate principle of purposiveness, requires that such 
tilings exist, and one can imagine a world perfectly fit for our 
cognitive faculties in which there were no organized beings, no 
beauty, and nothing to give rise to the feeling of the sublime. 
And yet it is quite a happy accident that such things exist for 
their mere existence offers objective evidence of a sort for the 
employment of reflective judgment's subjective principle. It is 
only the existence of beautiful objects which gives rise to the 
problem of aesthetical judgment, the solution to which provides 
independent grounds for the principle of purposiveness itself. 
And even more than this, Kant discovers a kind of symbolism 
in the beautiful and the sublime. It is a symbolism which 
seemingly issues from nature, while yet reminding man of the Good 
and of his moral destiny, one which offers one a glimpse of the 
possible unity of nature and freedom. It is because the standard 
of beauty is in ourseI yes, and not objectively present in nature, 
just as the moral law is in ourselves, that one begins to see the 
symbolical function of beauty as representing the Good. Nature, 
through her beautiful objects, harmonizes spontaneously with the 
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subjective needs of our cognition in such a way that the resulting 
aesthetic feeling of pleasure is conditioned a priori and not a 
posteriori, just as the immediate satisfaction of the moral agent 
is conditioned a priori by the mere form of moral maxims. The 
beautiful is especially suited to a symbolical representation of 
the good because both the beautiful and the Good are determined 
apart from any existing interest, both result in pleasure, and both 
claim necessity and universality while not admitting of proof. 9 
Through her beautiful objects, through what is_t nature offers us 
concrete examples of what ought to be, and in doing so, offers us 
a symbolical kind of assurance that she is suited to the concepts 
of our moral freedom. Thus beauty is said by Kant to be a symbol 
of the Good. 
The connection already established between nature and freedom 
is extended through a recognition of the sublime as a symbol for 
roan's moral destiny. Although occuring under almost opposite 
conditions than the beautiful, the spiritual feeling of the sublime 
happens precisely because reason has demanded so much of aesthetical 
imagination that aesthetical imagination becomes frustrated and, 
in relieving the frustration, can point only to the absolute 
grandeur or reason with respect to any aspect of nature. The 
rational idea demanded of our aesthetical imagination, as when 
we attempt to comprehend the vast grandeur of an Arctic wasteland, 
becomes its own object of praise following the frustration of 
imagination. Even nature's own presentation of power and vast-
ness must be regarded as taking second place to the power of reason 
as it secures man's freedom, and to its vastness of scope in 
assuring man's destiny. So the sublime is a symbol of man's 
moral destiny in much the same way that beauty is the symbol of 
the Good. 
Nature thus demonstrates an analogy to freedom through the 
principle of purposiveness insofar as the a priori satisfaction 
of, say, a beautiful object may be recognized as similar to the 
disinterested satisfaction of a moral agent. The principle of 
purposiveness provides a ground of mediation for our thought 
between the realms of nature and of freedom because, on the one 
hand it concerns what is, i.e. the particular as the subject of 
judgment, while at the same time prescribing what ought to be, i.e. 
a conformity with our ideas of reason. The is of the first 
Critique is thereby connected, if only througF an analogy, with 
the ought of the second Cri tique through the indeterminate concept 
of purposiveness. 
An important door has thus been opened by the special principle 
of reflective judgment which confirms the practical possibility of 
our access to a designed and unified nature which perfectly suits 
our practical ends. Kant remarks in his first introduction to the 
third Critique, concerning the concept of purposiveness, that we 
are concerned with nothing less than the possibility of experience 
as a system according to empirical laws. This possibility is 
far more elegant than it might at first appear since, under its 
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condition, we can imagine experience coming, as it were, fitted 
for our cognitive faculties, tailored as an elegant, uniform and 
simplified system, and offering immediate apprehension in 
accordance with purposiveness itself. We may say that reason is 
hoping, necessarily, to discover her ideals in the particular, and 
that, insofar as her ideals must be presupposed by reflective 
judgment, a door is opened to that actual possibility. 
Indeed, this possibility bears direct significance not only 
for the apprehension of nature considered by itself, but also for 
nature insofar as it must be compatible with our concept of free-
dom. The products of freedom, the objects of practical reason, 
are meant to take their place as a part of the natural realm--
actions and their effects are meant to be introduced as actualities 
in nature--and it thus becomes necessary to presuppose the 
possibility of a nature compatible with our moral ends. Man is 
a member of both the intellectual and empirical realm, and in 
order to assure the possibility of his empricial character as 
being in accordance with the moral law, it is necessary to suppose 
that nature itself will conform to the moral law's dictates. The 
necessity is, of course, a practical necessity, but it is a necessity 
nonetheless. .Judgment's special concept thus guarantees our 
interpretation of particular objects as purposive both for the 
conditions of the transcendental unity of nature, and for the 
categorical imperative. 
It now should be fairly obvious that the possibility of the 
summum boiium required by practical reason and discussed in the 
second" Cri tique, elicits a confirmation from the principle of 
reflective judgment itself. Since the principle of reflective 
judgment requires the suitability of nature to our moral ends, 
it leads inevitably to the concept of the suiiiiiium bonum in nature, 
and particular objects must be judged reflectively as according 
with this sumiiium bonum. This is nothing less than the practical 
demand for the perfect harmony of feeling, of nature, and of 
freedom; here reflective judgment has guaranteed the possibility 
of such an end on independent grounds. 
Throughout this essay 1 have tried to show why, in my opinion, 
Kant is successful in providing a ground of mediation between the 
realms of nature and freedom. Kant's own assumption that reason 
indeed has two separate employments in the theoretical and the 
practical, along with his tripart division of the soul into 
cognition, feeling, and reason (in short, his assumptions of 
plurality which require eventual unity if his philosophy is to be 
a system), have been taken more or less for granted in this paper. 
I will have to leave it for the reader to satisfy himself of the 
very great importance of these distinctions, which Kant claims. 
At any rate, it seems reasonable to say that Kant's special place 
in philosophy, as neither a realist, nor idealist, nor empiricist, 
nor rationalist, rests heavily with the mere existence of these 
di s t i nct i ons. 
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But I hope that I have succeeded in showing why, given 
Kant's own distinctions and, in particular, his elaborations of 
the realms of nature and freedom in the first and second Critiques 
that there is no absolute dualism infecting his philosophy^ 
Although both nature and freedom can only be regarded as objec-
tive insofar as they are conditioned through their separate and 
unique principles, one discovers in the domain of the particular 
(that is, the realm of immediacy and feeling) the single key 
which permits a mutual access between nature and freedom. This 
key, namely purposiveness as the principle of reflective judgment, 
can be used only on the condition that nature is purposive with 
respect to our judging faculties, and this assumption when it is 
spelled out means the necessary conformity of practical with 
theoretical reason, and of the i_s with the ought. 
Particular events and objects must be judged, then, according 
to the principle of reflective judgment and judged "as if" the 
ought and the i_s coincided. The ought (used in this sense as 
the ideas of reason in general) must coincide with the is (used 
in this sense as the objects of cognition in general) ifPorder 
for judgment reflectively to subsume the particular under the 
universal. Put in another way, the practical requirement for the 
activity of reflective judgment, namely the purposiveness of 
nature, must be regarded as a theoretical actuality in nature. 
It is thus possible, through purposiveness, to think the transi-
tion from nature to freedom, and indeed, to think of the possible 
underlying transcendental unity of the two realms. 
Moreover, the existence of beauty and the sublime in nature, 
as "happy extras," helps to provide further evidence for the 
ground of mediation between freedom and nature. It is the 
existence of beautiful objects, especially in nature, which leads 
to the discovery of the principle of purposiveness on independent 
grounds, and it becomes possible to understand beauty and the 
sublime in nature as symbols of man's freedom. 
The University of Kansas 
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